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The paper uses the substitutability between goods to model the transmission to 
other products of a consumption shock to one product.  The framework is used to 
analyse the impact on drinking of legalisation of marijuana.  For all types of 
consumers for example, the results indicate that legalisation would led to 
approximately a 4-percent increase in marijuana consumption, while beer, wine and 
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support of the Australian Research Council.1. Introduction 
 
The interaction of goods in the consumer’s utility function, as well as the 
operation of the budget constraint, means that a shock that affects the consumption of one 
product will have ramifications for the demand for related products. Thus while hot 
weather may well stimulate ice-cream sales, it would probably do so at the expense of 
other products; similarly, low-carb diets reduce the consumption of bread, pasta, etc., but 
have the effect of increasing other food items. This paper models such phenomena and 
applies the framework to analyse the possible impact on drinking of legalisation of 
marijuana consumption.  For all types of consumers, the results indicate that legalisation 
would led to approximately a 4-percent increase in marijuana consumption, while beer, 





2. The  Model 
 
In conventional consumption theory, the consumer chooses the quantity vector 
] q ,..., q [ n 1 ′ = q   to maximise the utility function   ) ( u q   subject to the budget constraint  
M = ′q p , where  ] p ,..., p [ n 1 = ′ p    is the price vector, and M is total expenditure 
(“income” for short).  This leads to a system of Marshallian demand equations of the 
form   ) , M ( p q q = .  Consider now an extended version of this theory in which some 
scalar shift variable  s  affects tastes, so that the utility function now becomes   ) s , ( u q .  
The associated demand equations now take the form   ) , M , s ( p q q = ,  which we 
approximate for good  i  as 
 
(1)                             ∑
=
η′ + η + α =
n
1 j
j ij i i i Dp DM Ds Dq ,                                
 
                                                 
1 For related research pertaining to drug usage, see, e.g., Chaloupka and Laixuthai (1997), 
DeSimone (2002), Lee (1993), Model (1993), Pacula et al. (2003), Saffer and Chaloupka (1998, 1999a, b) 
and Williams (2004). 
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where D is the log-change operator;   i α   is the elasticity of the consumption of good  i  
with respect to the shift variable  s;   i η   is the  i
th   income elasticity; and   ij η′   is the 
) j , i (
th  uncompensated price elasticity.   
 Let    ij η  be the   ) j , i (
th  compensated price elasticity and   M q p w i i i =   be the 
budget share of  i,  so that   i j ij ij w η − η = η′ ,  which is the Slutsky equation. Defining the 
change in real income as   ∑ = − =
n
1 i i i Dp w DM DQ   and using the Slutsky equation, we 
can then express equation  (1)  as: 
 
(2)                             ∑
=
η + η + α =
n
1 j
j ij i i i Dp DQ Ds Dq  .                             
 
We interpret the shift variable  s  as a binary variable reflecting two regimes, such that  
Ds  takes the value 0 (for regime 1) or 1 (regime 2).  We can then write equation  (2)  
under the regime 2 as 
 
(3)                                ∑
=
η + η + α =
n
1 j
j ij i i i Dp DQ Dq  .                               
 
To preserve the budget constraint, the coefficients of equation (3) satisfy ∑ = = α
n
1 i i i 0 w , 
∑ = = η
n
1 i i i 1 w , ∑ = = η
n
1 i ij i 0 w,  n ,..., 1 j= .  The coefficient   i α   is interpreted as the log-
change in consumption of good  i  resulting from the regime change when income and 
prices are held constant. 
Let   k uq ∂∂  be the marginal utility of good  k  and suppose that the regime 
change causes this marginal utility to increase by   k cu q × ∂∂,  where   0 c > ,  so that  
 
(4)                                                  
k
u
dl o g c
q
 ∂
=  ∂ 
. 
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To interpret  c,  recall that for a budget-constrained utility maximum, each marginal 
utility is proportional to the corresponding price,   ii uq p ∂ ∂= λ,  where  λ    is  the 
marginal utility of income. Accordingly for  i = k ,  kk d(log u q ) d(log ) d(logp ) ∂ ∂= λ + ,  
or in view of (4),   k cd ( l o g p ) = ,    if   λ   is constant. This shows that  c  is an “equivalent 
price change”, the fall in the price of   k  that would yield the same increase in 
consumption of the good as would the original shock. It can be shown (see Appendix) 
that equation (4) implies that:  
(5)                                                     ii k c α =− η .                                         
 
In words, the change in consumption of good  i  due to the regime change is proportional 
to that good’s elasticity of demand with respect to the price of good  k  , with factor of 
proportionality (the negative of)  c . This is an attractively-simple result linking the effect 
on consumption of  i  of the shock to  k  which involves the degree of substitutability 
between the two goods. Equation (5) also preserves the budget constraint as 
nn
ii ii k i1 i1 wc w 0 == α=− η = ∑∑ , where the last step follows from the aggregation constraint 
∑ = η
n
1 i ij i w , given below equation (3).  Accordingly, rule (5) serves to reallocate the fixed 
amount of income among the  n  goods following the change in regime. 
Figure 1 illustrates the link between the substitution effect and the shift in the 
demand curve in the log-linear case when goods  k  and  i  are substitutes  (so that 
0 ik η>).  With DD  the cross relationship between consumption of  i  and the price of  k  
under regime  1  , a lowering of  k logp   by  c  leads to the movement from the point  A  to  
B,  and   ii k logq c ∆= − η .  According to equation (5), the regime change causes this 
demand curve to shift to the left by exactly the same amount, so that the point on the new 





ik c − η
 
FIGURE 1 













3. Application  to  Legalisation 
 
A survey of students at The University of Western Australia inquired about the 
effects on the consumption of marijuana of a possible decision to legalise it (Clements 
and Daryal, 2004). As the survey does not contain similar precise information on the 
impact of legalisation on alcohol consumption, we shall show how the effects on drinking 
can be estimated by employing the above framework. 
For  i = marijuana,  the survey yields a value for   i α ,  which when combined with 
the  own-price elasticity   ii η   (from Table 1), we can obtain c from equation (5). Next, to 
estimate the change in consumption of alcoholic beverages following legalisation, we use 
in equation (5) for  i = beer, wine and spirits and  k = marijuana  this  c  value, together 
with the cross-price elasticities given in the last column of Table 1. The results are given 
in Table 2 for various types of consumers identified by sex and the intensity of use of 
marijuana. The key results are:  (i) For each user group, the consumption of spirits always 
falls the most with legalisation.  Next is wine, and then comes beer.  (ii) The largest fall 
in alcohol consumption is for the daily users.  The effects for weekly, monthly and 
occasional users are not too dissimilar.  (iii) For all types of consumers (panel H of the 
i logq
k logp  
D′ 
D′ (Regime 2) 
D
D (Regime 1)   5
table), on average legalisation is estimated to cause beer consumption to fall by about 1 
percent, wine by 2 percent and spirits by almost 4 percent, while marijuana usage 
increases by 4 percent.  It should however be noted that as the standard errors are 
relatively large, the changes in alcohol consumption are not estimated too precisely.  
TABLE 1 
 
COMPENSATED PRICE ELASTICITIES 
 
 (Standard errors in parentheses) 
 










Beer  -.17 (.09) .03 (.02) .06 (.03) .08  (.04) 
Wine  .09 (.05) -.36 (.19)  .13 (.07)  .15  (.08) 
Spirits  .17 (.09) .13 (.07)  -.60 (.32) .30  (.16) 
Marijuana  .10 (.05) .08 (.04) .15 (.08)  -.33  (.17) 
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TABLE 2 
              
EFFECTS OF LEGALISATION ON THE CONSUMPTION OF 
             
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND MARIJUANA 
             
(Standard errors in parentheses; percentage changes) 
               
 Gender     Gender 
Good  Male  Female All    Good  Male  Female All 
            
            
A. Daily users    E. No longer a user 
                    
Beer -5.15  (5.15)  .00  (.00)  -4.58 (4.67)   Beer -1.14(1.40) .00  (.00)  -.61 (.74)
                                       
Wine -9.66  (9.83)  .00  (.00)  -8.59 (8.91)   Wine -2.13(2.65) .00  (.00)  -1.14 (1.41)
                                       
Spirits -19.32  (19.65)  .00  (.00)  -17.17(17.81)  Spirits  -4.26(5.29) .00  (.00) -2.27 (2.82)
                                       
Marijuana 21.25  (14.80)  .00  (.00)  18.89(13.70)  Marijuana 4.69(4.67) .00  (.00) 2.50 (2.48)
                    
B. Weekly users    F. All users 
                  
Beer  -1.98 (1.73)  -2.71 (2.30)  -2.26(1.80)   Beer  -2.20(1.68) -1.50 (1.16)  -1.89(1.40)
                                         
Wine  -3.71 (3.31)  -5.08 (4.42)  -4.24(3.46)   Wine  -4.13(3.23) -2.81 (2.24)  -3.54(2.71)
                                         
Spirits  -7.41 (6.62)  -10.16 (8.84)  -8.47(6.92)   Spirits  -8.27(6.47) -5.63 (4.48)  -7.08(5.42)
                                         
Marijuana  8.15 (4.07)  11.18 (5.08)  9.32(3.19)   Marijuana 9.09(2.28) 6.19 (1.78)  7.79(1.49)
                  
C. Monthly users   G.  Non-users 
                  
Beer  -1.65 (1.44)  -2.21 (1.87)  -1.95(1.56)   Beer  -.05 (.05) -.09  (.09)  -.07 (.06)
                                         
Wine  -3.09 (2.76)  -4.15 (3.59)  -3.66(3.00)   Wine  -.09 (.10) -.17  (.17)  -.14 (.12)
                                         
Spirits  -6.17 (5.51)  -8.29 (7.18)  -7.33(6.00)   Spirits  -.17 (.21) -.35  (.34)  -.27 (.24)
                                         
Marijuana  6.79 (3.38)  9.12 (4.07)  8.06(2.79)   Marijuana .19 (.18) .38  (.24)  .30 (.15)
                  
D. Occasional users    H. All types 
                  
Beer -2.64  (2.16)  -.94  (.83) -1.77(1.39)   Beer -1.35(1.03) -.74  (.57)  -1.04 (.77)
                                       
Wine -4.95  (4.15)  -1.77  (1.59) -3.31(2.68)   Wine -2.52(1.98) -1.40  (1.11)  -1.94 (1.49)
                                       
Spirits -9.89  (8.30)  -3.54  (3.17) -6.63(5.36)   Spirits -5.05(3.96) -2.79  (2.21)  -3.88 (2.97)
                                       
Marijuana 10.88  (4.27)  3.89  (1.96) 7.29(2.35)   Marijuana 5.55(1.42) 3.07 (.86)  4.27 (.82)
                          7
Notes: 1. The zeros for the change in consumption of the four goods for two types of      
consumers arise because their consumption of marijuana was estimated by the survey not 
to change in response to legalisation. 
  2. For the derivation of the standard errors, see Clements and Lan (2005). 
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APPENDIX 
 
To derive result (5) we use an extended version of Barten’s (1964) fundamental 
matrix equation in consumption theory.  The consumer chooses the quantity vector q to 
maximise utility  () u, s q , where s is the exogenous shock to preference, subject to the 
budget constraint  M, ′ = pq   p  being the price vector and  M income.  The first-order 
conditions are the budget constraint and  u/ , ∂ ∂= λ qp where λ is the marginal utility of 
income.  
 
Differentiation of the first-order conditions with respect to M, p and s yields 
 
(A1)  
   / M        /         / s
      ,
0/ M     /     / s1 0
′ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ λ −     
=      ′′ ′ − ∂ λ∂ − ∂ λ∂ − ∂ λ∂ −     





2u/ ′ =∂ ∂ ∂ Uq q , I is the identity matrix and 
2u/ s . = ∂∂ ∂ uq   Solving (A1) for the 
second matrix on the left yields 
 













′ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ 
=  ′ −∂λ ∂ −∂λ ∂ −∂λ ∂ 
 ′ ′ − λ−   
   ′ − ∆ ′    − 
qq p q
p

















Up       
 
   () ( )
1111 1 1
   
−−−− −  ∂  ′ ′′ =− λ −   ′ ∂∆  
q








−−−− ∂  ′ ′′ =− λ −  ∆∂ 
q
p UpU UpUp q 
 
 in view of (A3).  It also follows from (A2) that  
 
    () ( )
1111 1
   ,
s
−−−− ∂   ′ ′ =− −   ∂∆  
q
p UpU UpUp u  
 
which, when combined with (A4), becomes    9










Equation (4) implies that the only non-zero element of u is the 
th k ,which equals 
() kk cu / q c p . ∂∂ = λ   As the term in square brackets in (A5) is the substitution matrix, it 
follows that  
 









  i1 ,, n , = …  
 
where  () () ik i k logq / logp , η= ∂ ∂ real income remaining constant. Interpreting the left-
hand side of (A6) as the growth in  i q   resulting from the regime change,  i, α this 
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Clements and Daryal (2005) develop a utility-maximising theory of how exogenous 
shocks to one market have implications for the consumption of related goods, and applied 
that theory to analyse the impacts on drinking of possible legalisation of marijuana.   
These notes set out the derivations of the standard errors of their projections. 
 
1.  A Brief Recapitulation 
Let  i p  and  i q  be the price and quantity demanded of good  i  (i = 1,…,n) and let  D  
be the log-change operator.  We can then express the demand for good  i  as 
 
(1)                                ∑
=
η + η + α =
n
1 j
j ij i i i Dp DQ Dq , 
 
where  i α   is the change in consumption due to exogenous factors other than income and 
prices;  i η   is the  i
th   income elasticity; DQ is the log-change in the consumer’s real 
income; and   ij η  is the  ) j , i (
th  compensated price elasticity.  If we write  i w  for the 
budget share of good i, then to preserve the budget constraint the coefficients of equation 
(1)  for  i = 1,…,n  satisfy ∑ = = α
n
1 i i i 0 w , ∑ = = η
n
1 i i i 1 w , ∑ = = η
n
1 i ij i 0 w,  n ,..., 1 j= .   
Let   k uq ∂∂  be the marginal utility of good  k  and suppose that an exogenous 
shock causes this marginal utility to increase by   k cu q × ∂∂,  where   0 c > ,  so that  
 
(2)                                                  
k
u
dl o g c
q
 ∂
=  ∂ 
. 
 
The quantity  c  is an “equivalent price change”, the fall in the price of   k  that would 
yield the same increase in consumption of the good as would the original shock.  It can be 
shown that equation (2) implies that:  
 
(3)                                                     ii k c α =− η .                                         
   2
In words, the change in consumption of good  i  due to the exogenous shock is 
proportional to that good’s elasticity of demand with respect to the price of good  k , with 
factor of proportionality (the negative of)  c .  This is an attractively-simple result linking 
the effect on consumption of  i  of the shock to  k , where the link involves the degree of 
substitutability between the two goods in question.  Equation (3) also preserves the 
budget constraint as 
nn
ii ii k i1 i1 wc w 0 == α=− η = ∑∑ , where the last step follows from the 
aggregation constraint 
n
ii j i1 w0
= η= ∑ , given below equation (1). 
A survey of students at UWA yielded information regarding the effects on the 
consumption of marijuana of a possible decision to legalise it, but no precise information 
on the impact on alcohol consumption.  These latter effects can be derived from the 
above framework as follows.  For  i = marijuana,  the survey yields a value for   i α ,  
which when combined with the  own-price elasticity   ii η   (from Table 1), we can obtain 
the value of c from equation (3).  Next, to estimate the change in consumption of 
alcoholic beverages following legalisation, we use in equation (3) for  i = beer, wine and 
spirits and  k = marijuana  this  c  value, together with the cross-price elasticities given in 
the last column of Table 1.  The results are given in Table 2 for various types of 














Source: Clements and Daryal (2004). 
TABLE 1 
      
PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND 
      
      
Good Beer  Wine  Spirits  Marijuana 
      
Beer -.17  .03  .06  .08 
      
Wine  .09 -.36 .13 .15 
      
Spirits .17  .13  -.60  .30 
      
Marijuana .10  .08  .15  -.33 
      
        3
 
TABLE 2 
              
EFFECTS OF LEGALISATION ON THE CONSUMPTION OF 
             
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND MARIJUANA 
             
(Percentage changes) 
              
 Gender      Gender 
Good Male  Female  All    Good  Male  Female  All 
              
              
A. Daily users    E. No longer a user 
              
Beer    -5.15  .00   -4.58    Beer  -1.14  .00    -.61 
               
Wine    -9.66  .00   -8.59    Wine  -2.13  .00  -1.14 
               
Spirits -19.32  .00  -17.17    Spirits  -4.26  .00  -2.27 
               
Marijuana   21.25  .00    18.89    Marijuana   4.69  .00    2.50 
              
B. Weekly users    F. All users 
              
Beer  -1.98    -2.71  -2.26    Beer  -2.20 -1.50 -1.89 
               
Wine  -3.70    -5.08  -4.24    Wine  -4.13 -2.81 -3.54 
               
Spirits  -7.41 -10.16  -8.47    Spirits  -8.26 -5.63 -7.08 
               
Marijuana    8.15   11.18   9.32    Marijuana   9.09   6.19   7.79 
              
C. Monthly users  G.  Non-users 
              
Beer  -1.65 -2.21 -1.95    Beer  -.05 -.09 -.07 
               
Wine  -3.09 -4.15 -3.66    Wine  -.09 -.17 -.14 
               
Spirits  -6.17 -8.29 -7.33    Spirits  -.17 -.35 -.27 
               
Marijuana    6.79    9.12    8.06    Marijuana   .19   .38  . 30 
              
D. Occasional users    H. All types 
              
Beer  -2.64    -.94  -1.77    Beer  -1.35    -.74  -1.04 
               
Wine  -4.95  -1.77  -3.31    Wine  -2.52 -1.40 -1.94 
               
Spirits  -9.89  -3.54  -6.63    Spirits  -5.05 -2.79 -3.88 
               
Marijuana  10.88    3.89    7.29    Marijuana    5.55    3.07    4.27 
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As the price elasticities and the consumption projections are both random, we 
shall proceed to derive their standards errors. 
 
2.  The Price Elasticities 
Clements and Daryal (2004) use Australian data to estimate the 4×4 matrix of price 
elasticities   ij  η   under the simplifying assumption that tastes with respect to alcohol and 
marijuana can be characterised by a utility function of the preference independence form.  
This means that the 
th  (i, j)  price elasticity takes the form 
 
(4)                                                       ( ) ij i ij j j w, η =φ η δ − η  
 
where φ is the own-price elasticity of demand for the group of goods as a whole, and  ij δ  
is the Kronecker delta.  Due to data limitations, Clements and Daryal (2004) also 
specified the values of the income elasticities as set out in the second column of Table 3.  
The other columns of that table contain the information on the budget shares.  As the 
income elasticities and budget shares on the right-hand side of equation (4) are treated as 
known, the only remaining unknown parameter is φ , which Clements and Daryal 
estimate by GLS to be 
 
(5)                                          ˆ φ=-0.429, with standard error 0.227, 
 
so that  ()
2 var 0.227 . φ=  The elasticities of Table 1 are derived from equations (4) and (5), 
and the information contained in Table 3. 
Under the above assumptions, the only random variable on the right-hand side of 
equation (4) is  φ.  Accordingly,  ( )
2
ij i ij j j var w var  η = η δ− η × φ  , or in view of equation 
(4), 
   5





η =φ  φ 
 .                      
 
Note that this equation implies that the t-value of  ij ij ij , var   , η ηη equals that for φ, 
var . φφ   We use the values of the price elasticities of Table 1, together φ= -0.429 to 





INCOME ELASTICITIES AND BUDGET SHARES 
 
Income elasticity  Budget share 
Product of income 
elasticity and budget 
share 
Good i 
i η   i w   ii w η  
Beer  .5 .4 .2 
Wine 1  .15  .15 
Spirits 2  .15  .3 
Marijuana  1.2 .3 .35 
Sum   1.00  1.00 
 






PRICE ELASTICITIES AND THEIR STANDARD ERRORS 
 









Beer  -.17 (.09) .03 (.02) .06 (.03) .08  (.04) 
Wine  .09 (.05) -.36 (.19)  .13 (.07) .15  (.08) 
Spirits  .17 (.09) .13 (.07)  -.60 (.32) .30  (.16) 
Marijuana  .10 (.05) .08 (.04) .15 (.08)  -.33  (.17) 
   6
 
3.  An Unattractive Procedure 
  The projected consumption of good  i  is defined by equation (3) for k = 4.  As 
mentioned above, the value for the change in marijuana consumption  4 α  is obtained form 
the survey, and we use equation (3) for i, k = 4 (marijuana) to obtain the equivalent price 
change as  44 4 c =−α η .  We then substitute this value back in equation (3) for i = 1, 2, 3, 







α= α η 
. 
 
Using equation (4) to substitute for  ij η  in the above, we obtain 
 




44 4 4 4
w w
1w 1w
 −φη η  −η
α= α = α    φη−η −η  
. 
 
The third member of equation (8) contains three basic ingredients, (i) the change 
in marijuana consumption  4 α , which is observed from the survey; (ii) the income 
elasticities of good  i  and of marijuana,  i4 and  η η , which are both treated as known; and 
(iii) the budget share of marijuana  4 w , also treated as known.  As the only unknown 
demand parameter φ does not appear on the far right of equation (8), we conclude that in 
this formulation there can be no estimation uncertainty stemming from the consumption 
responses.  We could, of course, use equation (8) in the form  ii 4 α =− β×α , where  i β is 
the known quantity  () i4 4 4 w1 w η− η , so that  ( ) ( ) ii 4 SE SE α =β× α .  But such a 
procedure would not be appealing as it treats all the demand responses as being known 
with certainty, which stretches imagination a bit.   
 
4.  The Consumption Projections   7
To avoid the above problems, we allow for uncertainty in the demand elasticities 
by ignoring equation (4) and adopt the following approach to shed light on the 
uncertainty of the consumption projections.  While this is only an approximation, the 
approach strikes a balance between (i) retaining the benefits of the assumption of 
preference independence as a way to structure the numerical values of the elasticities, and 
(ii) avoiding the unpalatable implication of all the consumption responses being known 
with certainty. 
  In equation (7) for i =1,2,3, we treat all three terms on the right as random 
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We use equation (9) to compute the variability of the consumption projections.  We 
substitute in (9) the value from the survey for   4 α , the consumption projections contained 
in Table 2 for  i (i 1,2,3) α=  and the price elasticities given in the last column of Table 4 
for   i4 η    (i = 1,…,4).  We also use the value of  4 varα   from the survey, and 
i4 var  (i = 1,...,4) η  from the last column of Table 4.  Table 5 gives the results for each of 
the eight types of consumer.  As can be seen, compared to their point estimates, the 
standard errors of the projected changes in alcohol consumption are fairly large.   
Equation (9) is an approximation, derived under some simplifying assumptions.  
Some insight into the impact of the assumptions is available from the “t-value” implied 
by equation (9),  
   8
TABLE 5 
              
EFFECTS OF LEGALISATION ON THE CONSUMPTION OF 
             
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND MARIJUANA: POINT ESTIMATES AND STANDARD ERRORS 
             
(Standard errors in parentheses; percentage changes) 
               
 Gender     Gender 
Good  Male  Female All    Good  Male  Female All 
            
            
A. Daily users    E. No longer a user 
                    
Beer -5.15  (5.15)  .00  (.00)  -4.58 (4.67)   Beer -1.14(1.40) .00  (.00)  -.61 (.74)
                                       
Wine -9.66  (9.83)  .00  (.00)  -8.59 (8.91)   Wine -2.13(2.65) .00  (.00)  -1.14 (1.41)
                                       
Spirits -19.32  (19.65)  .00  (.00)  -17.17(17.81)  Spirits  -4.26(5.29) .00  (.00) -2.27 (2.82)
                                       
Marijuana 21.25  (14.80)  .00  (.00)  18.89(13.70)  Marijuana 4.69(4.67) .00  (.00) 2.50 (2.48)
                    
B. Weekly users    F. All users 
                  
Beer -1.98  (1.73)  -2.71  (2.30)  -2.26(1.80)   Beer -2.20(1.68) -1.50  (1.16)  -1.89(1.40)
                                         
Wine -3.71  (3.31)  -5.08  (4.42)  -4.24(3.46)   Wine -4.13(3.23) -2.81  (2.24)  -3.54(2.71)
                                         
Spirits -7.41  (6.62)  -10.16  (8.84)  -8.47(6.92)   Spirits -8.27(6.47) -5.63  (4.48)  -7.08(5.42)
                                         
Marijuana 8.15  (4.07)  11.18  (5.08) 9.32(3.19)  Marijuana 9.09(2.28) 6.19  (1.78) 7.79(1.49)
                  
C. Monthly users   G.  Non-users 
                  
Beer -1.65  (1.44)  -2.21  (1.87)  -1.95(1.56)   Beer  -.05 (.05) -.09  (.09)  -.07 (.06)
                                         
Wine -3.09  (2.76)  -4.15  (3.59)  -3.66(3.00)   Wine  -.09 (.10) -.17  (.17)  -.14 (.12)
                                         
Spirits -6.17  (5.51)  -8.29  (7.18)  -7.33(6.00)   Spirits  -.17 (.21) -.35  (.34)  -.27 (.24)
                                         
Marijuana 6.79  (3.38) 9.12  (4.07) 8.06(2.79)  Marijuana .19 (.18) .38  (.24)  .30 (.15)
                  
D. Occasional users    H. All types 
                  
Beer -2.64  (2.16)  -.94  (.83)  -1.77(1.39)   Beer -1.35(1.03) -.74  (.57)  -1.04 (.77)
                                        
Wine -4.95  (4.15)  -1.77  (1.59)  -3.31(2.68)   Wine -2.52(1.98) -1.40  (1.11)  -1.94 (1.49)
                                        
Spirits -9.89  (8.30)  -3.54  (3.17)  -6.63(5.36)   Spirits -5.05(3.96) -2.79  (2.21)  -3.88 (2.97)
                                        
Marijuana 10.88  (4.27)  3.89  (1.96)  7.29(2.35)   Marijuana 5.55(1.42) 3.07 (.86)  4.27 (.82)
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i













From the last column of Table 4, the t-values of the  ij η  are of the order of  2, which 
means that each of the last two terms under the square-root sign in (10) is about   
()
2 1 2 0.25 = .  If there were no uncertainty regarding the estimate of  4 α , so that 
4 var 0 α= , then the right side of equation (10) becomes approximately   
1 0.25 0.25 1.4 −+ ≈ − .  As a nonzero value of  4 varα  has the effect of reducing the      
t-value absolutely, 1.4 plays the role of the maximum possible t-value.  On the other hand, 
there is the ignored covariance between the elasticities.  As the elasticitities are 
constrained by 
4
ii 4 i1 w0
= η= ∑  , this covariance is likely to be negative; thus allowing for 
a negative covariance term in equation (10) would have the effect of increasing the 
(absolute) t-value of the  i α .  These comments serve to highlight the qualifications that 
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